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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 07-1288 & 07-2309
___________
PERCY O. IRORERE,
                                           Petitioner
vs.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A75-880-700)
Immigration Judge: Walter Durling
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 22, 2009
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges





Percy O. Irorere, a native and citizen of Nigeria, seeks review of final
orders issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  For the reasons that follow,
we will grant the petitions for review.
  Irorere remains married to the same United States citizen who filed the1
previous I-130 petition on his behalf.
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On July 10, 1998, Irorere adjusted his immigration status to lawful
permanent resident on a conditional basis under section 216 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) based upon his marriage to a United States citizen.  Under
section 216, legal status is granted for two years, but within ninety days before that period
expires, the alien and his spouse must apply for the removal of conditional status on a
Form I-751 and present evidence of a bona fide marriage.  See 8 C.F.R. § 216.4. 
Alternatively, if an alien or his spouse is unable to file a joint application, the alien may
seek a waiver.  INA § 216(c)(4) [8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)].  Irorere failed to apply for
removal of the conditions or to seek a waiver, so his conditional resident status expired as
of July 11, 2000.  The government instituted removal proceedings in July 2006.
After a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found Irorere to be
removable.  Irorere, then represented by counsel, requested a continuance so that he could
pursue a Form I-130 immediate relative visa petition  to once again adjust his status as a1
lawful permanent resident.  The IJ found that Irorere was prima facie eligible to adjust his
status but also found that he did not have an approved I-130 visa petition and had not
arranged for one to be filed in advance of the hearing.  Moreover, the IJ did not believe
that the Department of Homeland Security would expedite any such petition because
  In his brief to the BIA, Irorere states that he was convicted of fraud.2
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Irorere had been convicted of a crime.   Combined with factors including Irorere’s failure2
to take any corrective action for more than six years, the IJ denied Irorere’s request for a
continuance.
The BIA dismissed Irorere’s pro se appeal.  In addition to the above
findings, the BIA noted the IJ’s finding at the hearing that Irorere, through counsel, stated
that the sole reason he had not timely filed an I-751 petition to remove the conditions on
residence was that he was unaware of the requirement to do so; the IJ found the
explanation did not constitute good cause or extenuating circumstances under INA
§ 216(d)(2)(B) to excuse the failure to timely file the I-751.  The BIA also noted that
while Irorere had presented “a litany of events” to the BIA to explain his failure to timely
file, these arguments were not raised below and could not be considered by the BIA in the
first instance.  The BIA found no error in the IJ’s denial of Irorere’s request for a
continuance and found no merit to Irorere’s claim that he was prevented from presenting
evidence to the IJ.  The BIA then denied Irorere’s post-decision motion, construed either
as a motion to reopen or as a motion for reconsideration.  Irorere filed pro se petitions for
review of both decisions.
The government has filed a motion to dismiss the petitions for review,
asserting that under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), we lack jurisdiction to review
discretionary decisions by the agency.  The government states that this matter involves the
  It appears from Irorere’s argument that he believes that his previously-3
approved I-130 remains viable today, notwithstanding the conditional nature of his
adjustment of status and the eventual expiration of that status.  Because the IJ found no
good cause or extenuating circumstances to excuse the failure to timely file a Form I-751,
and because Irorere had not applied for a waiver, Irorere’s path under that scenario would
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agency’s discretionary denial of Irorere’s request to file an I-751 beyond the typical
ninety-day filing period.  The government appears to refer to the IJ’s finding at the
hearing that Irorere presented no good cause or extenuating circumstances under INA
§ 216(d)(2)(B) to excuse the failure to timely file the I-751.  However, to the extent that
the agency decisions were based upon the IJ’s denial of Irorere’s motion for a
continuance to pursue a Form I-130 petition, we have jurisdiction over the petition for
review, and we review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion.  See Khan
v. Attorney General, 448 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2006).  Moreover, as the government
concedes, we have jurisdiction to review questions of law or constitutional issues raised
in Irorere’s petition for review.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Several of Irorere’s issues warrant only brief discussion.  First, Irorere
argues that the agency erred in requiring him to file a new Form I-130 immediate relative
petition, given that he already has an approved I-130 petition.  Irorere refers to the I-130
form prepared in 1997 upon which his immigration status was adjusted in 1998. 
However, Irorere’s conditional resident status expired and was terminated in 2001,
effective July 2000.  There is no evidence in the record that he had a current approved I-
130 petition at the time of the IJ hearing.   Next, Irorere contends that the IJ erroneously3
be to once again pursue an I-130 petition to adjust his status back to lawful permanent
resident.  Indeed, Irorere’s former counsel requested a continuance for that very purpose.
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made his criminal conviction–a non-deportable offense–a “key part of the deportation.”
Petr.’s Brief at 19.  We disagree, as it is plain that the IJ found Irorere to be removable as
charged because his lawful resident status had terminated as a matter of law, not because
of his conviction.  Also, Irorere argues that the IJ erred in combining a bond hearing with
his removal hearing in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(d) (now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)). 
The BIA noted in its decision that bond and removal proceedings are separate and apart. 
BIA Jan. 19, 2007 Decision at 3.  Upon review of the hearing transcript, although the IJ
observed that Irorere may not be eligible for bond, it does not appear that the IJ conducted
a bond hearing or entered any determination with respect to Irorere’s custody status or
bond.  We discern no error on these issues.
We now address Irorere’s due process argument.  Irorere claims that the IJ
prevented him a meaningful opportunity to show good cause and extenuating
circumstances for failing to timely file an I-751.  The BIA found no merit to Irorere’s
argument.  Noting that the IJ did not allow Irorere to read from a lengthy prepared
statement, the BIA stated that the IJ invited Irorere to tell his story in his own words after
his counsel had finished presenting his case.  Thus, the BIA concluded that Irorere had
the opportunity to present whatever information he wanted before the IJ entered his
decision.
 Irorere argues in his response to the government’s motion to dismiss that4
the BIA erred in failing to grant a continuance for him to apply for a hardship waiver
under INA § 216(c)(4) because he is prima facie eligible to adjust his status.  The BIA did
not address the issue.  However, although this issue is noted in his petition for review,
Irorere did not raise this argument in his brief, so we deem the argument waived.  See
United States v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Notwithstanding the BIA’s description of events, the transcript of the
hearing reflects that the IJ interrupted Irorere’s presentation mid-sentence, after only a
few words, and did not allow any further argument or evidence.  Instead, the IJ indicated
that he had already reached his decision in the case, advised Irorere to appeal to the BIA
if he so wished, and proceeded to issue the oral decision.  (Oct. 3, 2006 Tr. at 6-8.)  We
reject the BIA’s conclusion that Irorere was not prevented from presenting evidence at the
hearing.  We note that on appeal to the BIA, Irorere preserved this issue and proffered
details concerning a showing of extenuating circumstances.  The BIA characterized
Irorere’s allegations as “a litany of events” to make a showing under INA § 216(d)(2)(B),
see BIA Decision at 2, but the BIA refused to consider those assertions in the first
instance because none of the arguments were raised before the IJ.  However, it appears
from Irorere’s position that he did not present those arguments to the IJ because the IJ
denied him the opportunity to do so.4
We will grant the petitions for review and remand to the agency for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The government’s motion to dismiss is denied.
